Collaboration on Adversarial Threats and Security Risks Act (S.5105) — agreeing to delay a release would not violate the antitrust laws, on condition of written notice to the Justice Department first
A Senate bill under which exchanging information or assistance about AI security risks, and agreeing to delay or limit a release or deployment, would not count as a violation of the antitrust laws. For agreements to delay or limit, written notice detailing the risk and the scope of the restriction must go to the Assistant Attorney General before the coordination is undertaken.
Bill overview (primary data)
- Bill numberS. 5105
- TypeSenate Bill
- Congress119th Congress
- Latest actionRead twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.（2026-07-23）
Key points
- Exchanging information about AI security risks, and agreeing to delay a release or deployment, would not violate the antitrust laws.
- Agreements to delay or limit require prior written notice to the Assistant Attorney General detailing the risk and the scope of the restriction.
- The exemption is an affirmative defence, with the claiming entity bearing the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The text states it permits no price-fixing, market allocation, attempted monopolisation, boycott or exchange of price or cost information.
- Covered risks include theft or weaponisation by a covered nation, facilitation of weapons of mass destruction, and loss of control over critical infrastructure.
- Exchanging information carries no prior procedure while agreeing to delay release requires written notice — procedure follows nature.
1Starting from the premise that safety coordination can touch antitrust
Competitors talking to each other and agreeing to hold a product back is ordinarily a competition-law problem. This bill accepts that premise and carves out an exception confined to matters of AI safety.
Two kinds of conduct are covered: exchanging information or assistance about security risks, and agreeing to delay a release or deployment. The first stays with sharing information; the second aligns the timing of entering a market and differs in kind. Only the second carries the procedural condition of prior written notice.
2The conditions of the exemption are finely set
An entity receiving information must use it only for the security purpose and hold internal controls limiting other uses. The exemption does not operate automatically; it is framed as an affirmative defence, with the entity claiming it bearing the burden of proving good faith and exclusivity of purpose by a preponderance of the evidence.
The text further states that it permits no price-fixing, market allocation, attempted monopolisation, boycott, or exchange of price or cost information. It is drafted so that an entrance marked safety coordination does not open a path to ordinary conspiracy. Private rights of action are preserved for violations outside the exemption.
3The definition of covered risk runs wide
Covered artificial intelligence security risks are listed as theft or weaponisation by a covered nation or an entity it controls, substantial facilitation of the development or deployment of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or offensive cyber weapons, loss of operational control over critical infrastructure, and substantial reduction in the ability of developers or oversight bodies to monitor, evaluate, control or contain a system.
Of the 114 AI-related bills this site holds as of 2026-09-01, sorting the 44 not yet covered by the leading verb of the official title gives establish at 11, the most, require at 9, direct at 6, amend at 6, and 12 others. This bill takes the form of placing an exception inside an existing framework.
4Exchanging information is not the same as aligning timing
The bill covers two things. Both are coordination among competing firms, yet they differ in nature, and the procedures attached differ with them.
The exemption does not operate automatically; it is positioned as an affirmative defence, with the party asserting good faith and limited purpose bearing the burden by a preponderance of evidence. It further states that price fixing, market allocation, attempted monopolisation, boycotts and exchange of price or cost information are not permitted — closing the path from safety coordination to ordinary conspiracy.
Why it matters
Wanting to move in step for safety and coordinating in ways competition law forbids look alike from outside. This bill separates them with four things: confinement of purpose, internal controls, prior notice, and allocation of the burden of proof. For a developer, the line on how far information may be exchanged would appear in statutory text.
FAQ
Why would coordination be a problem?
What earns the exemption?
Could prices be discussed?
Sources (primary)
Source: Congress.gov (Library of Congress; U.S. legislative materials, public domain). Links go to the official site.
- Congress.gov (bill page, original)
- S. 5105（119th Congress）