ownCloud authentication bypass (CVE-2023-49105) — knowing a username is enough to read, alter, or delete files without authenticating
ownCloud, the self-hosted file sharing platform, contains an improper authentication vulnerability: if the victim's username is known and that user has no signing key configured, an attacker can access, modify, or delete any file without authenticating. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2026-08-27 with a due date of 2026-08-30.
Key facts
- CVE IDCVE-2023-49105
- Affected (vendor / product)ownCloud ownCloud
- CWECWE-287
- ExploitationListed in CISA KEV (exploitation confirmed)
- Remediation due2026-08-30 (U.S. federal civilian agencies, BOD 22-01)
Key points
- The affected product is ownCloud; the vulnerability name is "ownCloud Improper Authentication Vulnerability," CWE-287.
- The conditions are that the victim's username is known and the victim has no signing key configured; no authentication is required.
- The impact is access to, modification of, or deletion of any file — not reading alone.
- The vendor advisory frames it as a WebDAV API authentication bypass using pre-signed URLs.
- Added to KEV 2026-08-27 with a due date of 2026-08-30. Use in ransomware campaigns is recorded as not known.
- The attack needs only a known username and an unset signing key — neither a password nor a token.
1How light the precondition of "knowing a username" is
The stated conditions are that the attacker knows the victim's username and that the victim has no signing key configured. No password, no token. Usernames are frequently inferable — from internal share links, from part of an email address, from an organization's naming convention — and they are not treated as secrets.
That what stands as the precondition for attack is effectively public information is what sets the weight of this vulnerability.
2Pre-signed URLs and the signing key
The vendor advisory frames the issue as an authentication bypass of the WebDAV API using pre-signed URLs. A pre-signed URL embeds proof of validity in the URL itself so that authentication does not have to happen each time. That proof is anchored by a signing key, so where no key is configured, there is nothing for the check to verify against.
A design in which "not configured" collapses into "does not check" rather than "does not pass" is a recurring shape in authentication failures.
3Where self-hosted file sharing sits
ownCloud is a file sync-and-share platform an organization runs itself rather than entrusting to a cloud provider. The flip side of choosing where the data lives is that applying updates and reviewing settings are the operator's responsibility.
Working documents accumulate in a file-sharing platform, so the fact that modification and deletion are possible — not just reading — makes this a question of integrity and availability as much as confidentiality.
4Too little is needed for the attack
Only two conditions are given for the attack to succeed. Neither a password nor a token is required. Following them in order shows where the premise being protected breaks.
- 1Know a usernameOften inferable from a shared link, part of an email address, or an organisation's naming convention
- 2The signing key is unsetWhat ought to be verified does not exist at all
- 3Compose a pre-signed URLA mechanism embedding proof of validity in the URL passes with no proof
- 4Reach the filesFiles can be read, altered and deleted without authentication
A design in which the unset state falls to "does not verify" rather than "fails verification" is a recurring problem around authentication. ownCloud is a file sync and share platform run in-house rather than entrusted to a cloud provider, and the flip side of choosing where data sits is that applying updates and checking settings both fall to the operator.
Why it matters
With a self-hosted file-sharing platform, applying updates is the organization's own responsibility. When the precondition is close to "knowing a username," whether the instance is exposed externally directly bounds the damage. Asset management therefore has to capture not only product and version but whether the system faces the internet. And because addition to KEV is unrelated to the year of assignment, operations cannot treat an old CVE as an old problem.
FAQ
Is knowing a username really enough?
What is a signing key here?
Sources (primary)
This article is an independent organization based on the U.S. official data below. Always verify the exact, latest details and applicability with the official and vendor sources.
- CISA KEV Catalog (known exploited list)
- NVD (CVE details / CVSS)
- Vendor / reference advisory
- Vendor / reference advisory
- This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. KEV data is CC0 (public domain).